
[When I wrote my report Hollis in WWII as my October 2025 posting on coldspur (see https://coldspur.com/roger-hollis-in-wwii/) , I had not then been able to inspect three important files at the National Archives, namely the series KV 4/265-267, titled ‘Policy on Control of Communists – General’. I present here my analysis of the three, as an addendum to the earlier story, and as a necessary segue into my investigation into Hollis’s activities after the war, which will appear here at the end of this month. This is a straightforward B-class report.]
Contents:
Introduction to KV 4/265: 1940-1941
The File
Introduction to KV 4/266: 1941-1942
The File
Introduction to KV 4/267: 1942-1946
The File
The Overlooked Warnings
Conclusions
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Introduction to KV 4/265: 1940-1941
The twelve months between the sacking of Vernon Kell, Director General of MI5, in June 1940, and the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Nazis, in June 1941, were a tumultuous period for MI5, and Roger Hollis in particular. They involved the promotion of Hollis to B4, when his mentor, Jane Archer, was moved to head up the Regional Security Liaison Officers organization; Archer’s brief period in that role, her deference to Hollis’s wishes, and her eventual dismissal for insulting Jasper Harker; the often erratic efforts by Lord Swinton, as chief of the Home Defence (Security) Executive, to bring order and efficiency to MI5; the struggles of the nominal new Director General, Jasper Harker, to find his feet and establish a working relationship with Swinton; the nervous attempts by the Home Office and MI5 to deal with threats to industry articulated by the CPGB promoting the idea that the workers should be opposing the imperialist government rather than the Nazis; Hollis’s attempts to convince the RSLOs that too aggressive an approach to subversive Communists would play into the CPGB’s hands; the struggles of MI5 to find resources to deal with the broader Communist threat; David Petrie’s appointment as Director General, and his attempts to define his authority; and finally, the sudden change in CPGB policy when the Nazis invaded Russia, and the workers were soon urged to fight Nazism to protect the home of Socialism – a volte-face that put MI5 and Hollis back on their heels.
In his internal History of MI5, John Curry (who features in this saga) never mentions Hollis in the context of these events. He is very quick to criticize Swinton, in unsparing terms, and is also prompt to laud his own contributions to MI5’s responses, but he omits the many contributions that Hollis made to defining policy. Curry reveals that he knew more about the structure of Soviet intelligence than did his junior, and it may have been that he, with his own interpersonal problems, at the end of the war felt jealous that Hollis had replaced him as the head of the new F Division, and consequently gained so much of the limelight.
The File
Vernon Kell’s swansong was an attempt to gain an agreement with Alexander Maxwell, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office, who had sought his advice on the degree to which communists should be suppressed, given that the country might be at war with Russia [sic] soon. While the Labour members of the Coalition Government were hesitant to act, the regional Chief Constables were looking for firmer guidance. It seemed that new regulations would be necessary. Kell, writing as B4A1, dithered in his responses to inquiries. On June 8, Jasper Harker, Kell’s deputy, offered a weak addendum. Two days later, Kell was fired.
The record then jumps a month. By July 5, Jane Archer is in charge of the Regional Security Liaison Officers, a group established to take off some of the load from central MI5, and to support the local constabularies on policy issues. In a memorandum to them she writes: “It has been suggested by some Regional Officers that they should act as advisors to the Police in matters concerning the prosecution of Communists. Roger Hollis is very anxious that while you be kept informed of the policy as regards Communists, you should not let yourself in for advising in cases of prosecution.” She attaches Hollis’s memorandum. And in a rare example of her personal handwriting, she adds: “By the way it is most important that the fact that Ministry of Labour and MI5 consult on certain aspects of T. U. [Trade Union] problems should not become generally known. Will you therefore not stress this aspect with C.C.’s [Chief Constables].”
While this was a generous gesture to show that Hollis was now in charge of MI5’s position, Archer no doubt shared the opinions of her former protégé that MI5 had to stay out of the prosecution business, and it would damage relationships with the Ministry if it became known that information to be used in prosecutions came from the employer. Moreover, it did not want to do anything to provoke the CPGB, or agitators like the communist lawyer Denis Pritt, who would immediately pipe up with complaints about constraints on freedom of speech. Hollis’s carefully worded circular explained what the Communist tactics probably were, emphasizing that, if a known Communist did commit an offence, it was important that any prosecution should focus on the act of disruption of the war effort itself, and not on what the political allegiance of the perpetrator was. Sabotage was another matter, however, that might require the arrest of leading CP members.

The ninth meeting of the Security Executive on July 10 (at which there were an unmanageable twenty-five attendees, including Maxwell, Hollis, Harker, Jo Archer, and even the elusive F. W. Leggett) took a weak line on Communist activities. The minutes recorded the view that, if repressive action were taken against the Communist Party, people with Left Wing views might react unfavourably, and that ‘Further, there would probably be a hostile reaction in the Soviet Union’. From a propaganda standpoint, the government appeared to have lost the confidence of the public at large. It knew it needed to exert some authority, in Government, in factories, and the Services, but did not know how to choose between fresh regulations and exhortative bulletins. In any event, it meant that Hollis reinvigorated his communications with the RSLOs.
On July 17, Harker wrote to Maxwell, saying that he had prepared a draft letter to be sent to the Regional Commissioners on the subject of Communism, and that Lord Swinton had already approved it. It again comes across as weak and very defensive. Admitting that the Communist leaders are not fools, and that they know that a bald programme of revolution would win few recruits, Harker writes that ‘they have therefore tried to ingratiate themselves with the people by demanding, and often obtaining, the rectification of genuine abuses’, as if the CPGB were simply a louder version of today’s Liberal Democrats, a reasonable faction working for ameliorative social policies. If only Harker and Swinton had dared bring up the ‘genuine abuses’ that had been carried out in Stalin’s name in the 1930s, as opposed to whatever grievances had stewed before being addressed in the UK! The letter goes on to make some outrageous suggestions that the Communists might have some success in showing that the country has a ‘Fascist’ Government in sympathy with Hitler and that it was prepared, like the French, to sell the workers to him at the appropriate time.’ This nonsense was being distributed in July 1940, when Churchill was at the helm! It is beyond belief.

Jane Archer must have seen this circular, as the RSLO in Cardiff sent her a copy at the end of August. One could well believe that, if it was indeed Harker’s handiwork, how it may have prompted her to be offensive to his face. In any event, her days were numbered: she was sacked for insubordination to him in the middle of November. The record is surprisingly silent between September 1940 and January 1941, at which point Swinton gets more anxious about Communist activities, and urges his Executive (which has just recommended that the Daily Worker be suppressed) to consider more stringent controls over the CPGB itself. Next, the fear of a German invasion is raised, and Harker takes it upon himself to issue a note on the subject. On February 6, he sends a draft of it to Miss Jennifer [sic] Williams at the Home Office, Miss Williams being the secretary to Maxwell. She is also a Soviet agent, known better to posterity as Jenifer Fischer-Williams, and she will soon marry the MI5 officer Herbert Hart.

Hollis (who soon is identified as B4 rather than B4A1) continues his close involvement with the RSLOs. Even though Alan MacIver had been appointed the new head of the RSLO organization, Hollis’s circular of February 9 is signed off as both B4 and BR. It refers to a recent ‘Victor’ exercise, and it is essentially the ‘invasion’ warning that Harker claimed to have written, but it is certainly Hollis’s work. Moreover, it was quoted when the Royal Naval Intelligence Staff made inquiries to MI5 about measures against the Communist Party that were being considered. It is at this point that Harker receives a sharp letter of criticism from Swinton, effectively accusing him of not paying attention at meetings of the Security Executive, after Harker had requested permission to publish a White Paper on the proscription of the Communist Party. Hollis’s reputation seems to be on the ascendant, while Harker’s is moving in the opposite direction.
In March, David Petrie was appointed Director General, which introduced a new dynamic. It coincided with a fresh interest from the Home Office for a report on the CPGB, and Hollis took the opportunity to make an appeal to John Curry (Dy.B), deputy to Liddell, for more resources to cover the ‘Comintern’ angle (‘indications are that its policy is not friendly towards this country’ – indeed!). Curry, who likewise saw Petrie as a stronger champion than Swinton in this regard, showed a greater depth of understanding than Hollis when he minuted to Petrie on March 28 the necessity of tracking relations between the GRU, OGPU and the CPGB – an important aspect of Soviet counter-intelligence that was being overlooked. Hollis noted that he understood that Liddell had already hired a new officer for B4B who would work with Milicent Bagot on ‘the Comintern’ – which was the horizon of his understanding of the threat.
The outcome was that Hollis spent much of the summer giving the same talk on Communism to several regional Constabularies, and a transcript of his speech – which was overall received very well – was made. It is workmanlike, and provides the clearly uninformed audience a good insight into how the CPGB works, taking its orders from the Comintern and Moscow, and how big its membership is. He explains what the Party means in its policy of ‘revolutionary defeatism’, namely that the CPGB must work for the overthrow of the British government, and sabotage industry to the degree that civil war will break out. Yet, despite this dire warning, again the approach of appeasing the CPGB is expressed: “The Government has chosen a long term policy. They treat communism as a symptom of the need for essential reform and believe that the carrying out of such essential reforms over a period of years will materially reduce the support enjoyed by the Communist Party”. (In another version of the speech, the text refers to ‘many social inequalities that should be corrected and evened up’.)
This naïve misrepresentation of the revolutionary goals of the Communists is quite shocking ‘And what was the role of the Labour party in this dynamic?’, one might ask. Did Hollis really understand what the ‘Government’s’ official policy was? It is unclear where he gained his insights. And if anyone thought that the bloodthirsty goals of the Communists would be assuaged by some undefined ‘reforms’, they would be very much mistaken. That, sadly, appeared to be the view of many government officials at this time, however, and Hollis went along with that general sentiment. [His report should be published: maybe I shall transcribe it some time.]
Hollis’s address is also noteworthy for what it did not say. As I suggested above, he seems totally ignorant of the machinations of the GRU and the NKVD. He has nothing to say about the evils of Stalinism in practice, as if he were completely unaware of the history of the famines, the purges, the executions, the show-trials, and the labour camps, and he thus misses an opportunity to influence understanding. He also shows no indication of being familiar with the report on Krivitsky, and what the defector’s revelations had been concerning deeply laid espionage agents. Yet we know that he had seen the report, since in April 1941, he discussed with Pilkington how it should be packaged to be sent to the FBI. Perhaps these matters had no direct relevance to the law and order concerns of regional police officers, but one might expect that MI5’s presumed ‘expert’ on these matters would have something to say on Communism in practice rather than twittering on about its contribution to resolving social inequalities. Yet that was still the message he was delivering when he addressed a conference of Special Branch officers in Manchester on May 2, 1941.
Such activity continued into June. On June 22, Hollis wrote a response to Major Grant, the RSLO in Cardiff, who had been puzzled by what his Chief Constables in Wales had seen as a contradictory policy in dealing with prominent communists. Grant had said that his Constables were seeing a steady growth in Communist activity, with some speeches indicating that a throwing off of restraints was required. Apparently, MacIver had asked the Constables to ‘lay off Communists’, and Hollis tried to reassure Grant, in a rather anodyne letter, that MI5 was keeping a very close watch on the Party, and was consulting regularly with the Home Office. The very same day, the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa, and the world of the CPGB instantly changed.
Much of the remainder of the file is taken up with the strident calls for action from the CPGB, which hinted at dark deals being performed with Rudolf Hess, as the representative of Hitler, in his recent flight to Britain. The initial onslaught on Britain’s ‘upper class reactionaries’, who the Communists believed would reach an understanding with Hitler, was quickly toned down after Churchill’s expansive overtures to the Soviet Union, in terms that were both maudlin and melodramatic. (The file usefully includes the full report of the Parliamentary Debate on June 24.) Hollis had written to Hutchinson in the Home Office that, if the CPGB continued its absurd theme of deals with Germany, MI5 would continue to regard it with deep suspicion. At a meeting on June 25, the CPGB changed its tune to one of supporting the British Government. It was, however, a two-edged sword, since it at the same time recommended instant appeals for leniency towards communists, the restoration of the Daily Worker, and even (from Harry Pollitt) ‘the abolition of the officer class in the British Army’, an enterprise that would have been disastrous, as even Lenin found.

A letter from the ‘Secretariat’ at CPGB HQ had been distributed to all Party organizations, and on June 25 Hollis wrote a note laying out MI5’s policy in light of the changed attitude. John Curry (now head of the new F Division that Petrie, following Swinton’s preferences, had just implemented) agreed with it, as did Petrie, who sent to Swinton a letter on July 5 that reproduced Hollis’s comments. They are worth presenting:
In my opinion this is a mischievous documents [sic] particularly because it assumes throughout that the people of this country are at present divided in their attitude to the war, and that it is the duty of the Communist Party to unite them by brining [sic] about the removal of the traitors. If one admits, which is surely the truth, that the country is entirely united on the question of the prosecution of the war, it is clear that any agitation on the lines laid down in the attached circular from the Central Committee can only bring about disunity.
So long as the Party is only prepared to co-operate in the war effort on the terms that the war is run entirely in accordance with the Communist Party’s views, I feel that we should be making a very bad bargain if we were to accept the Party’s terms.
That strikes me as a very clumsy and timid statement of policy. It is not as if the CPGB had issued an ultimatum to the Government, or that it was incumbent on Churchill and his Cabinet to accept or decline the CPGB’s challenge. The vague rumblings about ‘unity’ were irrelevant, but also unconvincing. Hollis implicitly grants too much importance to the demagogues of King Street. It would have been better for MI5 to recommend simply ignoring what the CPGB said, especially given its erratic behaviour over the past two years, and to concentrate on simple messages to the populace about the continuing goal of defeating Hitler, with the country now in alliance with the Soviet Union. It was odd that Petrie – though somewhat diffidently – adopted Hollis’s stance, but maybe he was still finding his feet.
The Security Executive held its forty-first meeting on July 9, at which a major item on the agenda was ‘The Communist Party’. Hollis was present for this item only, while Harker represented MI5. It is noticeable that Hollis’s selection of the epithet ‘mischievous’ crops up frequently in the minutes, suggesting his memorandum had been broadly read. Those members who spoke up recommended no show of leniency to the CPGB in the fresh circumstances, and the Executive voted to continue the ban of the Daily Worker. Sir Frederick Leggett urged, however, that Communists not be singled out for exemption from call-up to the armed Services, and the meeting agreed that, despite divided loyalties, all recruits should be given a chance to show their willingness to fight Hitler. From the files, it seems that the Executive had not by that time read the CPGB’s latest manifesto, issued by Harry Pollitt on July 5, since Hollis sent it to Harker only on July 8. This message was now muted in its criticism of the intentions of the Government, and it called upon ‘all the people of Britain’ (as well as the Americans) to join the Soviet Union in fight against the Nazis.
Further evidence of the delay in the manifesto’s reaching the authorities is a minute of the Security Executive on July 16, where Swinton declares that the new attitude of the CPGB had been brought to his attention since the last meeting (had Harker been dilatory?). A. M. Wall reported that there were divisions within the Party concerning co-operation with, or hostility to, the reactionary government, and Hollis added that ‘the rank and file of the Pary were showing themselves more extremist than the leaders, and were finding it less easy to adapt themselves to the new line’. Wherefrom he derived this intelligence was not stated.
There the file stops. On August 1, Hollis was moved into F Division, as F2A, under John Curry.
Introduction to KV 4/266: 1941-1942
The second file covers a few short months, namely the period between July 1941 to February 1942. It reflects the continuing struggles of the Home Defence Security Executive, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Information to come to grips with the status and influence of the CPGB. The problem lies in their inability to handle the fact they have to deal with an entity that is directly linked to the government of an ally in war, but which is simultaneously pursuing the goal of destroying ‘capitalist’ Britain once the war is won. Hollis continues to play a leading role in the development of this strategy, and receives praise for his clarification of issues concerning the Comintern, and his unmasking of the true face of Marxist dogma. Yet his thinking reflects a common misunderstanding, namely that the Comintern is independent of Stalin’s dictatorship of the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Foreign Embassy is a cooperative and benign influence on the conduct of the war. The ability of the authorities to build a coherent response is hindered by the fact that the Soviet agent Peter Smollett is a dominant force at the Ministry of Information, while Desmond Morton, Winston Churchill’s intelligence adviser at 10 Downing Street, makes an awkward late entry into the debate. At the end of the file, Hollis is absent – presumably ill with tuberculosis. Roger Fulford and David Clarke thus deputize for him.
The File
The records show some residual actions by Hollis before he became F2A. On July 27, 1941, he and Alan MacIver (Jane Archer’s replacement as BR) write to the RSLOs, enclosing a note that they had prepared for the HDSE on the CPGB’s new policy of co-operation. They express some doubts, not concerning Pollitt’s sincerity, but over the fact that he may not be able to bring the rank-and-file to his side, or to overcome opposition at Headquarters in King Street. This distribution prompted something of a kerfuffle. Hollis sent it to Abbot in the MI5 Secretariat (who was also a member of the HDSE), but Abbot was on leave, and his deputy, Richard Butler, brought it to Harker’s notice, indicating that it was the first he had heard about it, and suggesting that Harker had likewise been ignorant about it. At the same time (since the insights expressed in the note derived from ‘secret sources’), Swinton had tried to prevent the document from being passed on, and he had kept it in his files. Swinton had read out the document at the recent HDSE meeting, however, and Jansen, in Naval Intelligence, had asked Abbott for a copy. It seems that Hollis had withheld what he was doing from Harker, but not from Petrie, who had blessed the whole project, and the unbowdlerized copy of the report was sent to Colonel Neville, the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, on August 3.
On August 20, Hollis (now installed as F2A) kept Vivian of MI6 in the loop, sending him his rough notes for the report he was preparing. Why he did not send the final report at this time is a mystery. Next, further indications of communist subversion were given at a meeting of the HDSE on August 28, where (as Mr Wall reported) the CPGB had been more active in infiltrating its members into the Trade Unions, whose rank-and-file were ignorant of the revolutionary techniques of espionage, sabotage, and intimidation. Petrie sought a bolder initiative from the Government to describe what its attitude towards the CP was. Swinton agreed, and recommended that MI5 prepare an authoritative paper that would cover i) a summary of Communist technique; ii) an account of CPGB activities before and after attack on Russia; and iii) a history of its open activities throughout same period. The meeting agreed, and it fell to Hollis to create this paper.

While starting out on that project, Hollis was still delivering addresses to the Regional Special Branches, and one given at Tunbridge Wells, on September 4, shows how his ideas have evolved. He largely repeats his analysis of the CPGB, but then takes a different tack. He concentrates very much on the history of the First, Second, and Third Internationals, and how Trotsky created the Fourth International, in an attempt to undo Stalin’s mischief. Yet Hollis is very naïve in thinking that the Comintern was a separate body, uninfluenced by the Soviet Government, and he even claims that the Soviet Union’s Foreign Office is ‘doing everything in its power to cooperate with us in the prosecution of the war’. One might respond, in imitation of Stalin’s reported comment to Churchill about the Pope: ‘How many divisions does the Comintern have?’. Hollis then introduces some fresher insights about the CPGB’s trying to establish its members in the Trade Union movement, and how they will call for increased production in the war effort, but then blame the employers if such does not happen. Again, it is a very cautious line that Hollis takes.
Hollis presented a draft of his paper on September 30. It is a long and fascinating document, another that merits publication in full. It gives an accurate account of the CPGB’s change of policy after Barbarossa, but clearly exposes its insidious (in Hollis’s words, ‘mischievous’) efforts to undermine the government and attack the owners of industrial plant. It highlights the dangers implicit in the CPGB’s ‘popular front’ policy, since so many people might be influenced by it in ignorance of the unchanged long-term revolutionary goals. Based on its reports from ‘secret sources’, it shows that Pollitt, when speaking at meetings, was more of a firebrand than his written statements suggest. Pollitt had by now also been calling for a ‘Second Front’ to be opened – an item of propaganda that would dog Churchill for another two-and-a-half years. (Yet the premature opening of an assault on Nazi-occupied France would have caused the deaths of hundreds or thousands of British ‘Tommies’, whom Pollitt claimed to represent.) Hollis concludes by stating that the CPGB’s offers of co-operation in the war effort are ‘specious’, and he emphasizes the continual attacks on the Government, the incursions made by the CPGB into the Trade Union Movement, and the exploitation of other media to assist in its propaganda. Yet he makes no recommendations on policy – but silence on that issue was what was surely expected of him.
Swinton introduced the report at the HDSE meeting on October 1, even declaring that ‘the memorandum had been prepared by the Security Service in close consultation with himself, and particular care had been taken to check the accuracy of all the statements made’. Whether Swinton should have involved himself so intimately is debatable: it surely would not have encouraged close questioning when the members of the Executive knew that their Chairman had already approved the report. After discussion, some minor amendments were made, and the Executive appropriately ‘invited the Chairman to forward to the Home Secretary’ the revised version of the MI5 Report. That was indeed done, and a rapid distribution to many other persons was made. Churchill sent it to all members of his Cabinet, and it went to the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Information, the Intelligence Corps, and other bodies. The fact that MI5 was using ‘secret sources’ to gain information about the CPGB would thus certainly have reached the hands of mischievous individuals whom no one at the time suspected.

A bizarre item of follow-up occurred, involving the self-regarding Desmond Morton, Churchill’s adviser on intelligence matters, and also a member of the HDSE. At its meeting on October 22, after Swinton informed the attendees that the Cabinet had already considered the MI5 report, Morton’s contribution was recorded in the following terms: “Maj. Morton suggested that by way of following up the memorandum it would be useful if further reports could be prepared showing how far the orders given to the Communist Party had resulted in successful action.” What orders had been given to the CPGB, and why it was expected that it would obey them, are not stated, but Swinton agreed, and delegated the follow-up to Mr. Wall’s Committee. Wall was responsible for Production in Factories, and a further minute suggests that it was the orders given by the Secretariat of the Communist Party to members that were being discussed. CPGB orders could presumably not be ignored, however (something Morton did not mention), but why would he describe the outcome as ‘successful action’? Presumably he means ‘co-operation’, and ‘increasing production’, but nowhere in Hollis’s report is that language used.
Swift outcomes to Hollis’s Report were not forthcoming. When speaking to the RSLOs at the end of October, Hollis had to state dryly that MI5 had ‘lost copyright’ to it since it had been distributed to Cabinet members. By then, however, a countermove had come from the Ministry of Information, who had allowed Peter Smollett to issue an ambivalent paper on its policy towards Communism and Russia. It hinted insidiously at class divisions (‘obvious differences between what may be loosely called the Capitalist and the Labour Classes’), which was a clumsy deployment of Marxist rhetoric. While the Ministry refused facilities for White Russians or English Reds to speak under the aegis of the Ministry, Smollett calmly arranged for Soviet speakers to arrive from Russia to address the populace! “It will be desirable to arrange for them extended tours giving them by arrangement with the appropriate divisions here, the maximum amount of radio and Press publicity. These speakers will be strictly under Party discipline and we need not, therefore, fear any ideological friction”, he wrote. No one seemed to question what he meant by that, but Brendan Bracken, the Minister, must have been already propagandized by the oily and dangerous Smollett.

What is more, the HDSE approved of this ministerial policy, even though the Foreign Office weakly questioned what was meant by ‘discipline’. Hollis apparently went along with it, as well, and was recorded as saying, without apparent irony, that Soviet War News, an official production of the Soviet Embassy, was ‘almost entirely non-political’. A complaint then came from an unexpected quarter, from Lord Rosebery, of the Civil Defence in Edinburgh, who was unhappy with local liaison with the Scottish RSLO (Perfect), and was dismayed by the emphasis on ‘Aid for Russia’ rather than ‘Aid for Britain’ in current Ministry of Information propaganda. Assisted by Hollis, Petrie replied weakly and evasively.

Yet Hollis gained more prestige by unearthing an excerpt from the Marx House Syllabus (published for the Marx Memorial Library * and Workers’ School on ‘Scientific Socialism’) that explicitly outlined the plans for ‘the use of force against the State machine’. On January 2, he shared it with E. H. Parker of the Ministry of Information, a member of the HDSE, having already read out the important parts of it at the Wall Sub-Committee of the HDSE on December 30. Wall – and then Petrie – were suitably impressed, and Petrie informed Swinton of the events, explaining that Wall wanted the text of Hollis’s ‘sermon’ to be distributed to everyone who had received the original Hollis Report. The HDSE took notice of Hollis’s offering at its 56th meeting on January 21, minuting under ‘Technique of the Party’:
The EXECUTIVE took note of SE/144, which contained extracts from a recent Marx House Syllabus entitled ‘Scientific Socialism’ showing that in its penetration of reputable organisations the Communist Party was aiming at obtaining a position of leadership, which could be turned to its own advantage when a revolutionary situation had been created.
What is notable, perhaps, is why it took so long for the HDSE to recognize this truth. Lord Rosebery was also shown this item, and took the opportunity to express his disgust, in a letter to Petrie on January 22, that arrangements had been made for the rascally Pollitt to speak in Glasgow on February 7.

[* This is the same Marx Memorial Library in which Roy Bland toiled. See Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, Chapter 17]
It appears that Churchill must have been roused by Hollis’s appeal for the Government to define its policy towards the CPGB, since a letter to Petrie by Desmond Morton, dated January 15, encloses a note that he had written for the Prime Minister about Communism. Morton considered himself quite an expert on the subject, since he had worked for MI6 in the nineteen-twenties on Soviet counter-intelligence, but his opinions were a mixture of the outdated and the truly bizarre. He makes a strong but false distinction between the Soviet Government and the Comintern (which he stubbornly refers to as the ‘Komintern’), claiming that Great Britain are allies of the former, but not the latter. Combined with this, he expresses some pedantic views as to whether the Soviet Government is truly ‘communist’ or not, and goes on about ‘so-called “communist” parties’, as if it mattered. Yet he is insightful about the insidious ways that the Comintern’s agents infiltrate foreign institutions, such as the Trade Unions, and offers some ideas for successfully propagandizing against its influence. His attacks on the Comintern leaders, as opposed to pointing out the realities of Stalin’s dictatorship and plans, show how misguided he was.
Churchill forwarded Morton’s report to Bracken, the Minister of Information, with the comment ‘This seems to be the right policy’. Maybe the Prime Minister had not read it properly, since it hardly constitutes a policy document. Maybe he was happy that Stalin was not mentioned, since one of his prime concerns at this stage was not to upset the vozhd. In any event, it caused a stirring in the dovecotes, and Petrie, rather unwisely, decided to respond to Morton’s lecture, certainly using Hollis to help him in his arguments. An extended exchange followed, in which Morton tried to clarify his stance. He displayed some questionable facts deriving from the British Mission in Moscow, as well as some anecdotes that are worth reproducing.:
Perhaps I told you that Madame Maisky [the wife of the Soviet Ambassador] readily confessed to me that the first duty of a Red Trade Union is to make the workers work and to recommend means of dealing with them if they are not working hard enough. Their second duty is the prevention of dangerous thoughts and ideas, and the third is the well being of the Labour Corps [=?].
and:
My latest information on the last point [the possession and use of private property] is that, whereas the Komintern promulgates this doctrine as fundamental, the citizen of Russia can now own property in a manner which differs little in effect from the way in which a British subject can own it in this country. Perhaps the philosophic background is being allowed to lapse and the unbridgeable gap is being filled in by seepage from below.
and:
On the other hand, if Russia gets what she wants by other means, and especially if Russia post-war policy becomes one of internal Imperialism aiming at a peaceful isolation of the U.S.S.R. in order to develop the country and improve the general standard of life, the Government of the U.S.S.R. may keep the Komintern down.
Enough of such nonsense. In her volume in the Government Official History Series, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence, the historian (or Historian) Gill Bennett has nothing to say about these proclamations by Morton. (Was she perhaps not shown the full files? She claims that she had been given ‘full access to official documents’. Tricky, is it not?) It is sad to think that Churchill was being primarily influenced by this eccentric individual. Nevertheless, it led to a meeting of the minds. Morton had lunch with Hollis early in February, and Morton subsequently told Petrie that they ‘had a long talk which was profitable from my point of view’. And Morton did express one observation that may have been important:
The present difficulty in getting action in this country about the Komintern is that the recognized political Parties, whether Tory, Radical or Labour, will not face up to the questions whether the C.P.G.B. is a Party within the meaning of an act, or something else, as you and I hold it to be. If it is a Party, then it is wrong to use permanent State machinery to combat it, though the other political Parties are free to do so through their own machinery. If you and I are right, it is not a function of the political Parties but of the machinery of State, whatever Party holds a majority in Parliament
When Petrie responded on February 19, he admitted that his comments came from Hollis. Part of the text ran as follows:
On the matter of the definition of the Communist Party as a political party and the responsibility of the State to combat it I do not feel that this depends entirely upon such foreign control as may be exercised over the Party by the Comintern. The policy of the Communist Party is unconstitutional in that it aims at the overthrow of the machinery of State by the armed revolution of a minority, and I consider that it is the duty of the State to protect itself. I agree, nevertheless, that this duty can be more obviously justified if it can be shown that the Communist Party’s policy is dictated from abroad
Those were Hollis’s last words before he went off to convalesce. He had an ally in Petrie, and was on the same wavelength as the man inside 10 Downing Street. How would the State decide how to protect itself? And, perhaps more to the point, why had the advice of Krivitsky been ignored in all these meanderings? I shall pick up that last question later in this report.
Introduction to KV 4/267: 1942-1946
This volume takes the story up to the end of 1946, by which time Hollis had been newly installed as B1, and the threat of war with the Soviet Union was now of pressing concern to the Chiefs of Staff. It is a sporadic collection, not only because of Hollis’s absence at a convalescent home in Gloucestershire for most of 1942, but because Britain’s Ministries seemed incapable of doing much beyond requesting updated reports on the CPGB from MI5. Ironically, Hollis’s illness allowed him to perform some further reading on Communism and Stalin’s policies, which enabled him to become a much more influential spokesperson on the threat from Communism than he had been beforehand.
The File

For most of 1942, Hollis’s friend Roger Fulford (whom he had brought into F Division) had to deputise for him. The problem of what to do about the growing membership of the CPGB, and what happened when members turned up in Government, continued to worry the HDSE – and even the War Office. On May 14, P. J. Grigg (who had just been appointed Secretary of State for War) wrote to John Anderson (then Lord President of the Council) about the disturbing case of Ivor Montagu. It does not appear that Grigg had any idea about Montagu’s role as a spy (later identified in the VENONA decrypts), but he had had to deal with the fact that Montagu had been turned down for some military post – possibly in Intelligence, where his brother Ewen had a prominent position – and had protested. Grigg’s introductory paragraph is worth quoting in its entirety:
The root of the troubles is, I think, the absence of a clear-cut Cabinet decision on the policy to be adopted towards the Communists and this in turn results from the awkward position in which they have placed us by the line they have taken since the entry of Russia into the war. On the one hand, they profess to be whole-hearted supporters of the war against Hitler’s Germany and base their criticism of the Government on the ground that it is not carrying the war against the enemy with sufficient vigour, in particular, by opening a Second Front in Western Europe. I was myself embarrassed at Cardiff by an offer by the local Communists to appear on the same platform in my support and only just managed to avoid giving a plain ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. On the other hand, the paper circulated to the Cabinet by Swinton last October (W.P. (41) 244) and two recent papers by Morrison (W.P. 42 142 and 168) show pretty clearly that the Party has not given up its ultimate revolutionary aims and suggest that its chief interest lies in a Soviet victory rather than the survival of the British Empire.
This passage merits an essay alone, but I would draw a few placeholding conclusions. Grigg was not a tough or determined enough individual to hold the post of Secretary of War. He has in particular been taken in by the Stalinist ‘Second Front’ propaganda, at a time when the Allies were waging the war on several fronts. Yet the Cabinet indeed had failed to give a lead, and Churchill was more responsible than the CPGB for the awkward situation, what with his gushing endorsement of Stalin in June 1941, and the appeasement of him thereafter. The highlighting of the CP’s enduring revolutionary goals and of its desire for the destruction of the British Empire (and the sources given) shows that Hollis’s assessments were influencing the leading members of the administration.
On June 7, an anonymous memorandum that recorded the story of ‘Government Policy Towards the Communist Party’ was filed, reflecting the influence of the infiltrated Ministry of Information, and trying to make distinctions between lack of encouragement of the CPGB itself, but not persecuting individuals because of their political persuasions. It was all rather a muddle: if policy could not be laid out in a few crisp sentences, it was not surprising that many were confused. And then, on June 24, Fulford announced that Hollis had come up with ‘an admirable new paper’, titled ‘The Revolutionary Programme of the Communists’. Roger had been catching up on his reading during his spell in the convalescent ward, especially Stalin’s book on Lenin. His report constitutes a fierce reminder that the current alliance against Hitler is only temporary, and that Stalin’s long-term goals are to destroy ‘the bourgeois state machine’. While this tract superficially suggests a refreshing switch by Hollis away from the phantom of the Comintern, the letter he sent with it shows that he still regards the Comintern as the greater evil. Moreover, he is very careful not to fall out of line: “ . . . it might be well to explain to the Foreign Office that we are not advocating a severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union!”. Yet one has still to ask: Would this really be news to any student of history, or any reasonably educated Government functionary?
While the discussions about the extent to which records on known Communists should be maintained went on throughout the summer, Hollis’s article gained new traction. On July 10, Anderson thanked Petrie for sending it to him: Petrie had also passed it to Maxwell, Duff Cooper, Alexander Cadogan and Norman Kendal. On September 16, Petrie sent a circular to all Chief Constables, trying to tidy up the matters of policy that had been dogging Fulford: because of the volume of paperwork, much record-keeping would have be decentralized to the regions. By December 10, Hollis was back in the office (and Fulford had moved on to become Assistant Private Secretary to Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air), although Liddell had noted his return on October 7. Maxwell had asked him for a paper, for the benefit of the Home Secretary, on the Communist Party’s policy since the beginning of the war. Hollis had obliged (with a 3000-word draft), in which he included some bloodthirsty excerpts from the Gas Industries House lectures, when speakers called for shooting army officers and members of the police. Hollis had gained Petrie’s approval. What happened to that report remains unstated, but on February 11, 1943, Petrie received another request from Strutt at the Home Secretary’s office reminding him that he had not delivered the ‘comprehensive report’ on the Communist Party that had been promised. Then the Foreign Office became involved: Peter Loxley informed Trenchard Cox in the Home Office that the US Embassy was starting a study into the state of the CPGB.
A charred and damaged version of Hollis’s report appears on file. He sent it to Maxwell on March 11, with a covering note that carefully explained what his sources were. Harker sent it to Coe at the US Embassy. At Maxwell’s request, Hollis added a passage on the Daily Worker. With some minor corrections, it was distributed to members of the Cabinet. By April 28, the War Cabinet was considering the report, alongside another on Sir Oswald Mosley and the British Union. Its minutes record the solemn statement:
In discussion, it was agreed that these two memoranda were of great interest and there was much to be said for their publication. But there were also serious objections. Thus, publication of the Memorandum on the British Communist Party might be a source of some embarrassment vis-a-vis the Russian Government. Moreover, publication at this juncture, when the question of Communist Party affiliation to the Labour Party was under discussion, might have the result of increasing the support accorded to the Communist Party.
It is for events like this that the expression ‘kicking into the long grass’ might have been coined. Who might have been embarrassed by publication? Stalin? Or the British authorities, for obviously engaging in snooping? It is not said. It was one thing for the Foreign Office to cozy up to Stalin, seeking ‘co-operation’, but for the War Cabinet to show such abject appeasement was deplorable. At this stage of the war, however, it was perhaps still concerned that Stalin might do another deal with Hitler, and that he should therefore not be ‘provoked’.
On May 22, the unprovoked Stalin announced that the Comintern had been dissolved, outwardly as a formal statement that its revolutionary goals were being abandoned, and a reassurance to Stalin’s allies that he would not become a threat to them. It was a very convenient gesture. Hollis was asked by the HDSE to interpret the announcement, and at the meeting on June 1 his comments were noted, namely that its relevance had dissipated now that the foreign Communist parties had matured. But Hollis had not been taken in. The minutes showed that his conclusion ran as follows:
- The dissolution of the Comintern would not affect the policy of the Communist Party of Great Britain in any way whatever, and
- The control from Moscow would be exercised in the same way as it had been exercised since 1940 by Stalin himself.
It had taken Hollis a while, but he got it right eventually.
Extraordinarily, the file shows nothing between June 1943 and December 1944, by which time Hollis has started thinking about post-war threats from the CPGB, with the probable extended war with Japan presenting fresh challenges with regard to Stalin’s policy. On December 18, Hollis presented to Petrie a note warning about communist penetration of the Armed Forces, the Civil Service, and the Trade Unions, with possible exposures through leakage of information. He saw the more isolated CPGB taking up the class war with renewed vigour, following the example of its cousins in Europe. He closed his memorandum with the words: “We have, perhaps, in the past given the Foreign Office too little assistance in supplying them with evidence of the degree to which political campaigns are inspired and run by the Communist Party.” Yet I suspect that the Foreign Office could have worked that out themselves: it was just that they (mostly) preferred not to deal with the truth.
The same themes dragged on into 1945. Hollis had to deal with Registry questions. The file says little. The war ended. And then Hollis woke up to alarming events. After his return from his trip to Canada and the USA, in a long memorandum to Petrie on December 3, 1945, he drew attention in his first sentence to ‘the recent developments of the CORBY [i.e. Gouzenko] case in Canada and the BENTLEY case in the United States [Elizabeth Bentley having confessed to the FBI her subversive activities as a spy]’. These were indications of more furtive, subterranean activity, and Hollis drew from it an expanded agenda for F2A and F2B, and a planned reorganization of his personnel into political and espionage subsections. Key among his proposals was the following:
The Counter-Espionage Sub-section would study, in collaboration with Section IX [of MI6], the various Soviet Intelligence Organisations which direct their activities against this country, and in addition would make a direct study of all Soviet Officials accredited to this Country and of such circles as special groups of the Communist Party within this Country from which the Russians are likely to draw their espionage agents.
Hollis’s heart was in the right place, of course, but it was all frightfully late, and he still missed the crucial point that the Soviet Union did not recruit its agents from the CPGB. He had, moreover, received no firm encouragement from his colleagues who should have known better, primarily Liddell and White, to think ‘out of the box’. And Petrie and Liddell had seriously fumbled the ball over Soviet counter-espionage.

The remaining item of interest is from a year later. In October 1946 the Joint Intelligence Committee resolved ‘that the Security Service should furnish a report, which the Chiefs of Staff could also forward to the Defence Committee, on the ability of the Communists to nullify the war effort, should war break out.’ The presumed foe was, of course, the Soviet Union. How rapidly had matters changed with the advent of the Cold War, and the risk of its becoming ‘Hot’ again (with Churchill having even considering initiating it with Operation UNTHINKABLE)! On November 11, Hollis, now ensconced in the new organisation as B1, submitted his paper ‘The Communist Party as a Fifth Column in the Event of a War with Russia’. He represented it as a serious threat, and he offered some suggestions as to how it could be neutralized. (The paper should be extracted with others for an edition of The Collected Writings of Roger Hollis.) After a few amendments, the report was circulated to the Joint Planning Staff, and it was received favourably. On November 18 they forwarded it to the Defence Committee. On November 20, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Prime Minister set up a new Committee to consider the implications of the JIC report. The Staff may not have known who the original author was, but Hollis’s mark had been made. The outcome was not fame, however, but a requirement to turn his attention to the more mundane but still very tricky problem of Vetting.
The Overlooked Warnings

One aspect of this whole saga that I find astonishing is the lack of any reference to Jane Archer’s report on Krivitsky. For the Soviet defector had clearly (in January 1940) pointed to the underground recruitment that the NKVD and the GRU had embarked upon, and he had also laid out a stark warning about the role of the CP in wartime. In Section 2: The Communist Party of Great Britain, Archer had written:
With British diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union strained as they are at present KRIVITSKY is genuinely astonished that he cannot in our press, or periodicals, or in the speeches of ministers, find any indication that the British people realise the gravity of the existence of such an organization as the Communist Party of Great Britan in time of war. He agrees that in time of peace the British Government are right in thinking that a healthy democracy will eventually cast off, or at any rate, keep in a state of impotence, undesirable elements in left wing movements, but in time of war, particularly when there is a danger of war with the Soviet Union, he is most emphatic that the existence of the Communist Party organization is a real danger.
KRIVITSKY is most anxious not to convey the impression that he advocates the eradication of any spontaneous Left Wing movement however revolutionary it may be. The point is that the Comintern no longer has any genuine interest in the needs of the British working class and that the Communist Party organization is merely a Russian agency superimposed upon extreme left-wing opinion in order that it may be used as a weapon to assist Stalin in his aggressive military policy. He is genuinely convinced that, in the event of war between Russia and this country, immediate steps should be taken to sterilize the activities of the Central Committee and all the paid officers and organisers of the Communist Party of Great Britain on the grounds that they are purely an agency of the Soviet-German war machine.
And one of his conclusions, concerning how the rapprochement with Germany and the invasion of Finland had not resulted in a serious drop-off in CPGB membership was:
He believes this is due to lack of force in our political propaganda and is very insistent that every effort should be made to find someone in this country who has the necessary knowledge and experience to create an organization to counter Soviet activities in the United Kingdom. He thinks such propaganda should emanate from a source which cannot be attributed to the Government.
Now one could argue that the situation had changed. Stalin’s alliance with Hitler did not evolve into a state of war between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union: Krivitsky misjudged the imminent threat. And others might suggest that Krivitsky was a still a Communist, somebody who had lost faith in Stalin, but still had nefarious aims himself, and should therefore not be trusted. Yet his message about defanging the CPGB by engaging in propaganda (at a time when Soviet aid to Germany was assisting in the latter’s bombing campaigns against the UK) was undeniably accurate and action-worthy. And it is the utter lack of any discussion at all of the Krivitsky report in the exchanges of the time that is really puzzling, if it had served only to debunk his recommendations. Had Krivitsky been forgotten? Had his portents been deliberately buried? What was going on?
Archer’s report had a broad distribution. We can be sure that, within MI5, it was read by Kell, Harker, White, Liddell, Hollis, Alley, and probably Curry. It was sent to Vivian and Menzies in MI6, Gladwyn Jebb in the Foreign Office, and Alexander Maxwell in the Home Office. A bowdlerized version was sent to the FBI. Jane Archer herself (by 1941 in MI6) obviously was intimately familiar with all its clauses and disclosures. Within MI5, John Curry apparently knew more about the NKVD and the GRU, but Hollis was the primary guardian of the jewels. I can find no evidence that Petrie had been given a copy to read. Why did Hollis stay quiet about it? Did no one on the Security Executive ask him about it? As far as we can tell, no.
If we look at a typical meeting of the Security Executive (for example that of November 12, 1941), the list of members includes nobody who can clearly be said to be familiar with the Archer report. MI6 is not represented. Newsam and Hutchinson (not Maxwell) represent the Home Office, Morton the Prime Minister’s Office. Petrie and Abbott are MI5’s representatives, with Hollis making occasional appearance on matters that concern him. Thus it is entirely possible that all the alarming descriptions of Soviet spies within the Foreign Office (e.g. ’the Imperial Council Spy’) and the ‘reporter in Spain’ were utterly unknown to those who should have had the most interest in investigating the account.
So why did Hollis keep it all to himself? Had he forgotten? Highly unlikely – it must have had a searing and unforgettable effect, and (for example) Dick White brought it up in May 1951 when HOMER was being investigated, and Hollis himself had to follow up on it with Vivian after Krivitsky’s death. Had Hollis rejected it? Again, very unlikely, considering that Hollis, in a roundabout way, came close to some of Krivitsky’s admonitions about Stalin. Had he deliberately muffled its conclusions (presumably the Pincher Doctrine) because it would in that way help his Soviet masters? He could hardly have got away with that if Liddell and White had been keeping an eye on things. The last alternative was that there was some policy of omerta – that senior officers in MI5 (with the compliance of Vivian and Menzies), in the pre-Petrie days, had decided that its content could be so embarrassing that it was better to pretend that the interrogations had never occurred, and to hope that its suspicions were unjustified. Yet the cat was out of the bag. If the Home Office and the Foreign Office and even the FBI had seen it, then MI5 could not be sure that it could confidently stifle the message.
Thus one has to conclude that Hollis was either being very obtuse, to the extent of not refreshing his memory while in convalescence, or was following a closely guarded procedure. And the fact that no obvious evidence has come to light of other officers not reprimanding him for ignoring the Jane Archer report, I conclude that the latter explanation is the likelier.
Conclusions
- The reputation of Hollis as a ‘plodder’ is confirmed by these documents. He was able to present himself as a thought-leader by staying just a little ahead of what was not a well-informed audience. Yet he did not exercise much imagination, and showed a lot of caution in expressing any conclusions as to how his evidence should be used.
- As the appointed ‘expert’, Hollis was slow in taking on the broader challenge of understanding what the real challenge of international communism was. He started out echoing the Harkeresque doctrine that Communists were simply noisy leftists expressing genuine grievances. He focused on the largely bogus Comintern for far too long, was able to bring greater focus on to Stalin during his convalescence, but very bizarrely ignored the issue of deep penetration of British institutions by Soviet spies.
- Hollis’s relative success was enabled by the timorousness of the Ministries he served, who also showed much historical ignorance. They were, however, not well served from the top, since Churchill’s appeasement of Stalin cast a continuous deference to the dictator’s wishes, and the penetration of the Ministry of Information by Smollett (and others) compounded the problem by promoting Stalinist propaganda.
- The events reinforce the fact that a pluralist democracy is reluctant to defend itself energetically against totalitarian threats, lest it adopt some of those techniques (as I wrote in Misdefending the Realm). Yet what might be justifiably be called the Conservative-dominated ‘ruling class’ in wartime Britain often displayed a lack of confidence in its position, and Attlee’s election win in 1945 laid bare its weaknesses. What the authorities should have done, however, was to educate the public about the practical horrors of Stalin’s alternative.
- The silence over Jane Archer’s report on Krivitsky remains a mystery. Here was a handbook on how the Soviet Union intended to subvert Great Britain’s democracy, and to encourage its destruction. Yet its outstanding lessons were not rejected, but ignored without discussion. The failure of anyone in authority to refer to the report indicates a severe embarrassment over its disclosures, and an improbably successful effort to eliminate it from collective memory.
- Overall, Hollis’s reputation was improved by his contributions. If not outstanding, his actions were honourable, and showed no signs of treachery. In his position, he could not have executed a strategy of sedition as a lone wolf. As the Cold War began, his analyses were well-regarded by a group as elevated as the War Cabinet. That reputation eclipsed what were his obvious failings as a personnel manager.

















































































































